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Bartender 775 Serial Keygen

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Within minutes of their arrival, the officers knocked on the door of apartment one and announced themselves as police officers. They received no response and did not hear anything from inside the apartment. At that point police dispatch advised them that the 911 call had originated from the bar. Officer Coup went downstairs to the bar. The police maintained surveillance of the door to apartment one, repeatedly knocking and announcing themselves as police officers. The bar is located down several stairs from the street level. Inside the bar, afemale bartender identified herself and told Officer Coup she was the 911 caller. She stated that (1) a female by the name of "Kay" had come into the bar and asked her to call the police; (2) when the bartender asked Kay if she was all right, Kay responded, "no"; (3) Kay's hair was soaking wet, her shirt looked like it had been pulled or stretched, and she was carrying her dog; (4) Kay's tone of voice was "frantic" and she appeared to be "very upset"; and (5) the bartender knew that Kay stayed in apartment one "a lot." The bartender also knew that anunidentified male lived in apartment one. The bartender informed Officer Coup that after Kay asked her to call the police, she (Kay) went out the door of the bar and toward the apartment building entrance. No one saw whether Kay returned to apartment one. [Note 4]

The Supreme Judicial Court has observed that "[s]o long as the judge's account is plausible in light of the entire record, an appellate court should decline to reverse it. 'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.'" Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc. , 424 Mass. 501 , 510 (1997), quoting fromGallagher v. Taylor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 876 , 881 (1989). After a review of the entire record, we conclude that this is not a case in which the judge decided to credit one of two permissible views of the evidence. Instead, after making a series of subsidiary findings that have support in the testimony of the witnesses, the judge reached conclusions that are not supported by the evidence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Holley, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 659 , 664 (2001). In particular, thejudge found that any emergency that may have existed "was long over by the time the officers arrived," and that Kay "was apparently uninjured and out of the apartment." These ultimate or conclusory findings are not supported by the evidence, which the judge credited, that only a few minutes before the police arrived, Kay appeared at the bar looking disheveled, frantic, and"very upset," asked the bartender to call the police, and said that she was not all right. [Note 9]

b. Whether Kay returned to apartment one. The only genuine conflict in the evidence was whether the bartender told the police that Kay returned to the apartment after asking the bartender to call the police. Based on the testimony about the relationship between the apartments and the bar, including two photographs that were introduced as exhibits, the bartender could not have seen whether Kay walked up the steps to the apartment building's outside door once she left the bar. Officer Coup testified initially that the bartender told himthat Kay "headed back towards the apartment" after leaving the bar. The judge overruled the defendant's objection to that testimony. On cross-examination, Officer Coup conceded that the bartender was not in a position to see whether Kay had entered the apartment after leaving the bar, but he testified that in his police report he wrote that the bartender told him that Kay had walked back "towards her apartment." He added, in reply to a further question by defensecounsel, that the bartender may have observed that Kay took a right turn as she left the bar, which was in the direction of the apartment. The judge found that when Kay left the bar, "[n]o one saw whether Kay went to Apartment # 1 or not."

This subsidiary finding is supported by the evidence and is entitled to deference. Moreover, the judge was not obliged to find, as Officer Coup testified, that the bartender saw Kay turn right when she left the bar. [Note 10] However, the judge did not explicitly reject that testimony by Officer Coup. In these circumstances it is open to an appellate court to imply additional findings of fact so long as (1) "the evidence is uncontroverted," and (2) "the judge explicitly orimplicitly credited the witness's testimony." Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334 , 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008). Here, the only evidence on the question of what Kay did after leaving the bar is Officer Coup's testimony, elicited on cross-examination and unaccompanied by a motion to strike, that he recorded in his police report what the bartender told him, which was that the bartender saw Kay turn right when she

left the bar. Sergeant Zampitella also testified that this is what Officer Coup told him the bartender had said. See Commonwealth v. Marchione, 384 Mass. 8 , 12 (1981). We thus consider this implied finding along with the other subsidiary findings that are supported by the evidence.

[Note 1] The case is before us as a result of the allowance of the Commonwealth's motion for an interlocutory appeal. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 15, as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). Based on the evidence seized from the defendants apartment pursuant to the search warrant, he was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm without a firearms identification card (G.L. c. 269, 10[h]); unlawful possession of ammunition (G.L. c. 269, 10[h]); defacing the serial number of a firearm (G.L. c. 269, 11C); improper storage of a firearm (G.L. c. 140, 131L); and unlawful possession of a class E substance (G.L. c. 94C, 34).

[Note 5] Sergeant Zampitella testified that at the moment he made the decision to enter, he had information from the police dispatcher and the tenant from apartment two, and now information from the bartender that "a female had gone into the bar requesting help. Her shirt was pulled." The female requested that the bartender call the police. "She -- you know, her hair was wet and she had a pulled shirt. And that's, basically, what we had." It is not significant that Sergeant Zampitella may not have known every detail related by the bartender to Officer Coup, because the law provides that "the knowledge of one [police officer] ... [is] the knowledge of all." Commonwealth v. Zirpolo, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 307 , 311(1994), quoting from Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 356 Mass. 337 , 340 (1969).

[Note 8] In other parts of his decision, the judge repeated some of these subsidiary or ultimate findings, and made others along the same lines, e.g., it was "clear" to the police when they arrived that any disturbance "was no longer occurring"; the police had no information "that anyone was in the apartment"; after speaking to the bartender "it was apparent that 'Kay' was no longer in the apartment"; and "[t]here was no evidence of any safety risk if the officers failed to act immediately."

[Note 9] The judge also found that "[t]he bartender did not observe [that Kay had] any cuts, bruises, or abrasions." This finding is entitled to deference as a subsidiary finding because it is based on a permissible view of the evidence. However, it does not supply an adequate foundation for the judges other ultimate findings or conclusions that Kay was not injured, that any incident of domestic violence was over, and that she was not in need of emergency assistance.

on the door. Schultz opened it, appearing agitated and flustered. Officer Malone asked Schultz about the male occupant of the apartment. Schultz told her no one was there, but when confronted with the fact the officers heard voices, summoned Robertson from a nearby bedroom. When Robertson appeared, the officers enteredSchultz's apartment based upon her acquiescence only." 170 Wash. 2d at 760. In Shultz, the court enunciated six factors that it regarded as essential to invoke the emergency aid exception: "'(1) the [police] officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed assistance for health or safety concerns; (2) a reasonable person in the same situation would similarly believe that there was need for assistance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assistance with the place being searched ... ' (4) there is an imminent threat of substantial injury to persons or property, (5) state agents must believe a specific person or persons or property is in need of immediate help for health or safety reasons, and (6) the claimed emergency is not a mere pretext for anevidentiary search." Id. at 754, quoting from State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash. 2d 373, 386-387 (2000). Although the Supreme Judicial Court has not adopted a comparable set of criteria, we think the Shultz criteria are consistent with the emergency aid exception under Massachusetts law. We also conclude that on the record before us, the police satisfied these criteria. It is of particular significance that in the present case, unlike in Shultz, it was the victim who requested that the bartender call the police and who told the bartender that she was not all rightafter the upstairs tenant heard a male and a female arguing and crashing sounds coming from the apartment frequented by the victim.

[Note 13] As noted earlier, we give deference to and accept the judge's subsidiary finding that no one saw Kay entering the apartment after speaking to the bartender. We reject the judge's findings that Kay was uninjured, that whatever incident that occurred earlier between Kay and her boy friend was over by the time the police arrived, and that Kay was not in the apartment at the time of the warrantless entry, as unsupported by the evidence and implausible when considered in relation to the judge's other subsidiary findings of fact, as well as the finding we imply that the bartender reported to Officer Coup that Kay turned right when she left the bar. See part 2.b, supra. 2ff7e9595c